Introduction
I have been wanting for a little while now to write some about Stoicism and Christianity from an exegetical perspective. My plan is to take chunks of text from Marcus Aurelius, Seneca, Epictetus (maybe others), translate them and comment on them, and then compare what they have to say with relevant biblical texts. I do, actually think that the ancient Stoics have important things to say to us today, but I also think that very similar and more complete things can be found in the Bible.
Today, given that I finished Ryan Holiday’s The Obstacle is the Way not too long ago (and posted a review that, I hope, was generous and honest), I thought I would start with one of his key texts from Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 9.6, and ask whether Holiday has understood and applied the text properly, and, if not, does it affect Holiday’s overall message in his book (which is, I want to emphasize, a positive and truthful message). This will involve analyzing the translation that Holiday depends on, that of Gregory Hays, because it seems clear to me that Holiday is not one who reads Marcus Aurelius in the Greek.
This isn’t meant to be a criticism, just an observation, but it does put Holiday in a vulnerable spot since his understand of Marcus Aurelius will be necessarily dependent on what Hays thinks the old Princeps thought and intended. If Hays’ translation has eccentricities or inaccuracies, Holiday’s understanding could be biased by those inaccuracies. This being said, it might be that Holiday also has misread Hays. In fact, the whole process of an idea working its way from Marcus Aurelius’ mind to my understanding of The Obstacle is the Way is very much like a game of Telephone. So what I want to investigate and clarify is what kinds of transformations of meaning might have happened along the way.
As I said in my review, Holiday structures his book in a threefold manner based on the following text from Marcus Aurelius (using Hays’ translation):
Objective judgment, now at this very moment.
Unselfish action, now at this very moment.
Willing acceptance – now at this very moment – of all external events.
That is all you need.
From this, Holiday appears to conclude that the process of making the obstacle into the way forward involves:
- altered perception;
- intentional action;
- a persevering will.
Did he use this text correctly? Does it mean what it seems to mean in Hays’ translation? Let’s take a look.
Translating Meditations 9.6
Text
In the original Greek (yes, Marcus Aurelius, the Roman Emperor, wrote it in Greek, not Latin), this passage looks like this:
Ἀρκεῖ ἡ παροῦσα ὑπόληψις καταληπτικὴ καὶ ἡ παροῦσα πρᾶξις κοινωνικὴ καὶ ἡ παροῦσα διάθεσις εὐαρεστικὴ πρὸς πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τῆς ἐκτὸς αἰτίας συμβαῖνον.
Transliterated, it looks like this:
Arkei hē parousa hupalēpsis katalēptikē kai hē parousa praxis koinōnikē kai hē parousa diathesis euarestikē pros pan to para tēs extos aitias sumbainon.
Here is a very rough, painfully word-for-word translation:
Sufficient is the at-hand estimation clearly grasped, and the at-hand action oriented toward the community, and the at-hand disposition that is well pleased toward every thing happening from external cause.
This is not a good translation (I’ll offer a marginally better and more polished one below), but through it you might come to have some idea of what the Greek words are saying if you don’t read Greek (and if you do read Greek, it will help you see why I translate the way I do and critique me intelligently).
Structure
Even if you don’t know Greek, you might be able to discern a repetition in the text: three times the author says παροῦσα (parousa). This is important. Not only does this repetition mark the three-part structure of the text, it also unites them – all three parts have this modifier in common. If we were to format the text in a way that reflects visually this linguistic structure it would look like this:
Ἀρκεῖ:
- ἡ παροῦσα ὑπόληψις καταληπτικὴ
- καὶ ἡ παροῦσα πρᾶξις κοινωνικὴ
- καὶ ἡ παροῦσα διάθεσις εὐαρεστικὴ πρὸς πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τῆς ἐκτὸς αἰτίας συμβαῖνον.
Commentary
ἀρκεῖ
Notice that the verb arkei (“it is sufficient”) governs each of the three clauses (or perhaps I should say that it is governed by all three of the clauses, since what he have technically is a three-part compound subject, but that’s really neither here nor there). In terms of what this text is about, arkei is the single most important word. The problem Marcus Aurelius is addressing is solved, he says, by realizing that something is enough. What that something might be is found in the three subsequent clauses
παροῦσα
Next in importance to arkei is the repeated parousa. This is a present active participle of pareimi (“to be present” or “at hand”) that modifies each of the three following nouns and means something like “available” or “present at hand” or “what you have with you”. Whatever is sufficient, it is something that is already present to the author and reader. So right away, before we even know what is sufficient, we can see something of the purpose of this text: it is saying that you have everything you need for the task at hand. What you have available is enough. You don’t need some resource out of your reach, something you cannot control. So you can relax. It also means, though, that you cannot make excuses, because the sufficient things that are at hand must be among the categories of things that are, in Epictetus’ words ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, eph’ hemin, “on us” or “things we can control”. So what are these “at-hand” things that are sufficient?
(1) ἡ … ὑπόληψις καταληπτικὴ
The noun ὑπόληψις (hupalēpsis) means, literally, “a taking”, but here it has the sense of “estimate” or “opinion” or “assumption”. I like the translation “supposition” or “notion”. “Judgment”, as Hays renders it, works, as well, so long as we understand it to be a measured assessment. By the way, ἡ (hē) is a definite article (it means “the”), and even though it comes before parousa it belongs with the noun.
The adjective καταληπτικὴ (katalēptikē) means “that which is directly apprehended”, which could mean “empirically apprehended” or “whatever has presented itself to your senses” or even “verifiable”. However, katalēpsis is also a technical term in ancient philosophy generally and in Stoicism specifically. It is an important part of the ancient Stoic theory of knowledge. The Stoics taught that all knowledge begins with impressions from our senses, and we can either assent to those impressions or reject them through the activity of our reason. An impression that is apprehended clearly and with conviction after the assent of our reason is katalēptikē. This is, I think, what Marcus Aurelius means here – a reasonably held notion of the situation, whatever it might be, that has been drawn directly from sensory perception and considered with the power of one’s reason.
This harmonizes well with παροῦσα, the idea of the phrase being that whatever the challenge is, the idea or estimate that you have developed from data that is available to your senses and that, after considering it rationally, is your best working estimate, that is sufficient. I think Marcus Aurelius is encouraging himself here to trust his gut and not worry about all the things he could not know.
(2) ἡ … πρᾶξις κοινωνικὴ
The noun πρᾶξις (praxis) means “act” or “action”, and it’s ultimately what is behind the English words “practice”, “practical”, and “pragmatic”. (So a pragmatist is someone who values and emphasizes what is practical over what is theoretical or ideal.) The adjective κοινωνικὴ (koinōnikē) means at times “what is held in common” or “sociable”. Here, the sense seems to be action that pertains to the good of the community rather than to the good of the self. So the phrase as a whole says that whatever community-oriented action that presents itself in the moment is what is sufficient. It may not be the ideal action, but the action that is available, so long as it aims at the common good, is the right one to take.
(3) ἡ … διάθεσις εὐαρεστικὴ πρὸς πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τῆς ἐκτὸς αἰτίας συμβαῖνον
The noun διάθεσις (diathesis) means “disposition” or “condition” or even “composition”, and here it is applied to the reader’s soul or inner person. We could translate it as “attitude”. It has to do with the arrangement or alignment of the mind or soul and the resulting preparedness for certain kinds of feelings, thoughts, and actions. So what kind of “disposition” or “attitude” does Marcus Aurelius say is sufficient? One that is εὐαρεστικὴ (euarestikē) “well pleased” with (pros) every happening (pan to … sumbainon) that is from an external cause (para ektos aitias). This is a disposition that takes in all the external things that cannot be controlled with εὐαρέστησις (euarestēsis) “the state of being well pleased”. This is the amor fati, the love of fate, that Holiday and the Stoics talk about.
Overall, the point of this text seems to be: 1) don’t get stuck waiting for perfect evaluations or perfect actions – what you have is enough; 2) what it takes to solve a given problem is not out there beyond your reach, but within you and within your reach; 3) regarding the things that you cannot control, the events caused by external things, you do have the power to prepare your soul to be well pleased with (not merely to accept) whatever comes your way.
Assessing Hays’ Translation and its Impact on Holiday
So how do I feel about Hays’ translation of this passage? It’s okay. It has strengths, but I also feel like it has some pretty significant weaknesses that could predispose any but the most careful of readers to misunderstand Marcus Aurelius’ purpose. Here it is once again:
Objective judgment, now at this very moment.
Unselfish action, now at this very moment.
Willing acceptance – now at this very moment – of all external events.That is all you need.
(1) Burying the lede
In my reading of this passage, the single most important word is arkei, “it is sufficient”. In my opinion, Hays’ translation makes this word sound almost like an afterthought. He moves it to the end of the sentence for style purposes, but this affects the balance of emphasis. It sounds like a tag rather than the central idea.
(2) Overdoing the urgency
On the other hand, what really stands out in Hays’ rendering of the passage is the repeated “now at this very moment”, which must be his rendering of parousa. As I have pointed out, this is a participle (meaning a verbal adjective) modifying the three nouns, hupalēpsis, praxis, and diathesis and meaning “what is present” or “at hand”. But Hays’ rendering makes this participle essentially into an adverb, because now it answers the question of “when” (right now! immediately! no delays!). It’s not that this rendering is entirely wrong. It’s that it imbalances the natural emphases of the original text, and the result is a translation that sounds more American and modern than it does like Marcus Aurelius or the ancient Stoics.
(3) Objective how?
As I mentioned before, “Judgment” works for hupalēpsis. Technically, “objective” works for the adjective katalēptikē, in its general (if not its techical) sense. But while “objective” ought to be a useful and clear word, in my opinion, its usage in the real world is vague and, at times, verging on self-contradictory. I suspect Hays chose it to mean “based on observed facts” or “dealing with an external, material object rather than with thoughts or emotions”. This meaning I would accept as a valid rendering of katalēptikē. But “objective” also means “not based on prejudices or subjective interpretations”, and at the level of popular usage this generally entails considering multiple points of view beyond one’s own observations.
In other words, in my opinion, the modern use of the English word “objective” is incoherent. One could argue that this incoherence simply points to the impossibility of objectivity, that objectivity is itself an essentially impossible ideal that is only achievable for a hypothetical being whose subjective point of view is comprehensive (i.e., God).
In any case, I don’t think what Marcus Aurelius is urging himself/his reader to do is seek out multiple points of view before making a decision. Quite the contrary. He’s saying that whatever your point of view is, so long as you are looking at observable facts and have considered those facts rationally, not being moved your emotional and unmoored interpretation of those facts, that point of view is sufficient for the task at hand.
So, bottom line, I’m not a fan of Hays’ choice of the word “objective”. I don’t know if English has a good single word equivalent, but we could just render it with the phrase “based on observed facts” (for the general usage) or “rationally considered” (for the technical sense).
(4) Unselfish action
I like this rendering.
(5) Willing acceptance … of all external events
Again, it’s fine, but a little bland, in my opinion. I’m not sure how Hays tracks “willing acceptance” with the individual words diathesis euarestikē (I suspect it’s more paraphrastic than formally equivalent). I don’t see “acceptance” being a good rendering for the word diathesis, and “willing” is too bland for euarestikē (not just willing but well pleased). On the other hand, if diathesis is behind “willing” and euarestikē behind “acceptance”, then Hays has swapped the places of noun and adjective, which, to me, is cavalier. There are pragmatic (in the linguistic sense) implications of parts of speech. The noun is naturally going to have a place of primacy in our understanding of a noun/adjective pairing, so when you swap them in your translation, you change the emphasis slightly. In any case, I’m not the biggest fan of this translation of diathesis euarestikē. The latter part of the translation, “…of all external events”, on the other hand, is fine.
Did this affect Holiday?
Holiday says very clearly that he loves Hays’ translation of Marcus Aurelius because of its dynamism and, perhaps, earthiness. It is conceivable that the imbalances I identify in Hays’ rendering here in 9.6 influenced Holiday’s reception and application of Marcus Aurelius. However, I will give Holiday this credit – I think that overall, despite a certain intellectual and linguistic sloppiness in The Obstacle is the Way, Holiday understands the spirit of Marcus Aurelius pretty well. I see a lot of Holiday’s book in this passage, but specifically in my rendering, not in Hays’. The way Holiday managed to do this is by not depending overly on any single passage for his understanding of Marcus Aurelius but on his overall reading of Meditations. This means that he managed to get behind the weaknesses of his preferred translation even though he seems unaware of those weaknesses. So, even though Hays’ rendering here is not particularly strong, Holiday gives us a reasonably good picture of Marcus Aurelius’ thoughts, overall.
Did Holiday Use the Text Rightly?
But what about Holiday’s particular use of this text? He uses it as a framework for solving problems, for making an obstacle itself the way past the obstacle. Now, Meditations 9.6 comes to us without context, so it isn’t 100% certain what the purpose of this text is. However, I think in this sense, Holiday’s use is justified. Moreover, I think while I have nitpicked elements of Hays’ translation, the “Perception” and “Will” parts of The Obstacle is the Way do, in fact, reflect Marcus Aurelius’ intentions in this text.
However, it is the second element of the three-part structure, what Hays translates as “unselfish action” (the one unquestionably good part of the translation), that Holiday doesn’t accurately apply. There is nothing in the “Action” third of The Obstacle is the Way that has to do with community-oriented action. In fact, I would argue that the book as a whole often sounds very self-centered. Holiday is far more concerned with intentional and persistent action than he is with community-oriented or unselfish action.
That is not to say either that 1) part 2 of Holiday’s book is without value, or 2) that it does not reflect Stoic thought or Marcus Aurelius’ thought, specifically. Part 2 is, in fact, very good – maybe the best part of the book. And it is permeated with real Stoic ethical ideas – just not praxis koinōnikē.
Conclusion
This post has already grown longer than I originally envisioned, so I’m stopping it here. I do have more to say, specifically about how Marcus Aurelius uses this triad of notion-action-disposition (mind-body-heart?) elsewhere in a different way and for a different purpose. I also want to reflect on what the Bible has to say about what Meditations 9.6 says. All of this, however, will have to wait for future posts.
Nevertheless, I did say I would offer a more polished alternative translation of the text. It certainly isn’t as punchy as Hays’ translation (whatever else I might say about his translation, it is dynamic and very readable), but it is as accurate as I can make it:
Sufficient for the task are:
- the assessment that you already have that is based on observable facts and rationally considered;
- and the action that you already have that benefits the community;
- and the disposition that you already have that is well pleased with whatever happens from external causes.
Bite-Sized Exegesis 